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Abstract: During the last years, the developing regions have come under increased pressure
by the developed countries, in particular the USA, to join the international eﬀort in global
greenhouse gas abatement. On the one hand, the participation of the developing regions
would oﬀer the developed world with low cost opportunities for abatement. On the other
hand, the economies of some developed regions such as China and India exhibit such fast
growth that they are expected to be responsible for a signiﬁcant part of future emissions
during the next decade. The latter regions object to the imposition of emission targets on
their economy as it would signiﬁcantly hamper their economic growth. This paper focusses
on the consequences of certain proposals to set emission targets for developing countries,
here China. One of these proposals follows the USA by letting China accept its projected
’Business-as-Usual’ emission level for 2012 as its target. A proposal by the Center for Clean
Air Policy takes more consideration for the viewpoint of the developing countries by imposing
a so-called ’growth-baseline’ for China, where a target is set on its emission eﬃciency.1 Introduction
The success of international climate agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol depends
heavily on the willingness of its participants to achieve the targets agreed under such
agreements. A crucial factor for such willingness are the costs of abatement. Since
climate change is a global issue, the location of such abatement does not matter, which
makes it optimal to look for the cheapest options available. The inclusion of developing
regions into the international eﬀort to mitigate the consequences of climate change on the
international economy oﬀers opportunities for low cost abatement that cannot be found in
the developed countries. Including developing regions into, for example, emission permit
trading, would therefore signiﬁcantly decrease the cost of abatement for all participants
of emission permit trading. The signiﬁcance of including developing regions into emission
permit trading has also been recognized by Kemfert and Zhang (2003) who investigate
the economic and environmental implications of regional coalitions cooperating on R&D
investment to trigger the adoption of low cost environmentally friendly technologies in
their economies. One of the results of Kemfert and Zhang (2003) is that developing
countries need to be involved in these coalitions in order for the negative economic eﬀects
of emission reduction commitments on both industrialized and developed countries to be
completely oﬀset.
Emission permit trading not only oﬀers a cost saving opportunity to Annex B regions
to meet the targets in the Kyoto Protocol, but it oﬀers also a new source of export earnings
for non-Annex B, in particular developing regions. Achieving the goals set in the Kyoto
Protocol will change consumption and production patterns within the Annex B regions
and these changes will have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on international trade. As a result, the
developing regions will be aﬀected through conventional trade linkages with the Annex B
regions. These eﬀects will be diminished to the extent that emission trading reduces the
cost of achieving the Kyoto target.
The number of developing regions in the world is large and very diverse depending
on the state of their development. On the one hand there are African developing regions
which are just at the beginning of their development. Then there are fast growing regions
as China and India, Brazil and Mexico, that, over the years have developed an industrial
infrastructure and, apart from being primary goods exporters, have developed manufac-
turing as a base for their exports. On the other hand, there are developing regions such
as the so-called East-Asian tiger economies of whom South-Korea is short before being
allowed to the OECD. The consequences of joining an emission permit trading market
are therefore most signiﬁcant for the latter regions which are already closely entwined in
international trade structures.
The fast growing developing regions have a rapidly growing consumption of fossil fuel
energy and it is expected that these regions will soon be responsible for a signiﬁcant
2contribution to greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere. Among others, the United
States therefore required a signiﬁcant contribution of these regions in the international
eﬀort to mitigate the consequences of increasing greenhouse gases on our society, for
example by imposing a realistic target. These developing regions claimed that imposing
such emission targets would seriously hamper their growth. Consequently, the inclusion of
such fast growing developing regions into an emission permit market regime would require
some thought on imposing a realizable target of emissions on these regions.
This paper focusses on the consequences of setting emission targets for developing
countries, here China. It considers the situation where the Annex B countries have an
emission permit market for 2010 and forward in place where, for each period after 2010,
emissions for participating Annex B regions are tied to 1990 levels as mentioned in the
Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol. The Annex B emission market is modeled using an
intergovernmental trading model (see Zhang (2000)), where governments decide not to
allocate the assigned amounts to the production sectors, and retain the sole right to trade.
Each production sector then decides whether to control emissions or to buy suﬃcient
permits to cover their emissions by comparing the control costs with the market price
of permits. It then studies the consequences of a developing region, China, joining the
Annex B regions on this permit market under the following regimes of allocating an initial
endowment of emission permits to China, in comparison to a ’Business-as-Usual’ scenario,
where no action to cut emissions is undertaken, as well as to a scenario where an Annex
B emission permit market is in place after 2010:
• China is allocated its oﬃcial 1990 level of CO2 emissions as its initial endowment of
permits. This scenario resembles the oﬃcial requirements as stated in the Annex B
to the Kyoto Protocol,
• China is assumed to adopt emission growth targets equal to its ’Business-as-Usual’
emissions level for 2010. This scenario is based on United States (1998),
• China’s emissions target is established by tying its emissions budget to improvements
in the ratio of carbon emissions to gross domestic product. This scenario has been
proposed by the Center of Clean Air Policy as stated in Hargrave (1998).
Including China into an international emission permit trading regime according to one
of these scenarios has a major impact on international trade ﬂows, and consequentially,
consumption and production patterns in all regions, and in China, changes. It is not
straightforward to see who beneﬁts and who looses as many eﬀects oppose each other.
Computable General Equilibrium models oﬀer a solution to study the direct as well as
indirect eﬀects of such shocks on international trade ﬂows, due to the modeling of an
equilibrium on more than one market simultaneously. We use the ’World Integrated
3Applied General Equilibrium Model’ (WIAGEM) which is an Integrated Assessment (IA)
model that combines a multi-sectoral multi-regional general equilibrium model, based on
the MS-MRT computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, with a climate model, and a
damage assessment model. For the purpose of our simulations, we limit WIAGEM to its
CGE model. The regional aggregation of this CGE model consists of 12 trading regions,
among which the Annex B regions and China. The sectoral aggregation in each region
consists of 15 production sectors among which ﬁve energy sectors. Primary production
factors are capital and labour (see Kemfert (2002)).
In Kemfert et al. (2003), WIAGEM was used to analyze possible strategies to convince
the United States into adopting more stringent greenhouse gas targets in 2010. One of
these strategies is to involve commitments by developing countries, a point often stressed
by the United States (see United States (1998)). Our paper recognizes the importance of
the role of the developing countries in the ongoing discussion on the mitigation of climate
change eﬀects on the economy. We however focus on the allocation of commitments to
these developing regions, using the diﬀerent proposals described in the aforementioned
scenarios.
This paper is subdivided as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief description of
the WIAGEM model. We concentrate this description on the economic sub-model in WI-
AGEM. The interested reader is referred to Kemfert (2002) for the technical details on
the economic model and the other sub-models. In Section 3, we describe the setup of the
simulations, by constructing a ’Business-as-Usual’ scenario, an Annex B permit trading
scenario, and three counterfactual scenarios, the latter corresponding to the aforemen-
tioned policies. In Section 4, we analyze the simulation results. The paper is closed with
some conclusions in Section 5.
2 The model
WIAGEM combines an inter-temporal general equilibrium model, based on the ’Multi-
Sector Multi-Regional Trade’ (MS-MRT) model, with an energy market model, a climate
model, and a damage impact model. For the MS-MRT model, we refer to Bernstein,
Montgomery, and Rutherford (999a) and Bernstein, Montgomery, Rutherford, and Yang
(999b). Within the scope of this paper, we limit our attention to the economic part of
WIAGEM and refer the interested reader to Kemfert (2002) for more information on these
extensions. The time horizon is 50 years, incremented in 10-years time steps. It takes
1995 as its benchmark year but it is calibrated using the GTAP4 database complemented
with GTAP5 data. The model considers the period from 2000 to 2050.
42.1 Economy
WIAGEM aggregates the world into 12 trading regions, which we enumerate in Table 1.
Within this set, we distinguish the subset AnnexB = {CAN,EU15,JPN,REC,USA} referring
to the regions that signed the Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol.
ASIA: India and other Asian countries
CHN: China





MIDE: Middle East and North Africa
REC: Russia, Eastern and Central European Countries
ROW: Rest of the World
SSA: Sub Saharan Africa
USA: United States of America
Table 1: The regional aggregation in WIAGEM.
WIAGEM extends the originally 9 production sectors in the MS-MRT model in each
region to 15 production sectors. These sectors produce 13 tradable goods, which we
summarize in Table 2, and another good that refers to investment.
Agriculture
Coal






Petroleum and coal products




Table 2: The sectoral aggregation of traded goods in WIAGEM.
The production factors used in WIAGEM are capital and labour. Physical capital
is malleable but cannot be transferred across sectors. Capital stocks increase over time
5due to investments from output produced for domestic sales, and decrease due to depre-
ciation at a constant geometric rate. The MS-MRT model assumes a two year gestation
lag for capital investment and a uniform pattern of investment within a given 10-years
period. This means that, if I(t) is the rate of investment in period t, then 2I(t) units
of capital enter the current capital stock and 3I(t) units of capital are delivered in the
next period. The labour force in each period is determined by population growth and
labour-augmenting technical progress. These growth factors are externally given.
For each fossil fuel sector in each region, there exists a resource of this fossil fuel at
each time period. The relation between depletion eﬀects on the supply of oil, gas, and
coal, and the actual supply of these fuels is ignored. The model does not keep a record
of the current stock of each fuel in each time period. This resource therefore represents
the demand for this fossil fuel resource in each time period. This demand is assumed to
be constant over time.
Each tradable good in Table 2 is produced in each region by one unique production
sector using a constant returns to scale production technology with the goods in Table 2 as
intermediate goods, and labour and capital as production factors. Under these conditions,
the optimal demand for these inputs are given by the cost minimizing amounts to produce
one unit of output times the activity level. According to Bernstein et al. (999a), the
competitive ﬁrms also undertake investments which arbitrage current investments against
future returns. All investments are forward looking and the producer anticipates the
eﬀects of announced policies that are to take eﬀect in the future.
We distinguish between non-energy and electricity production sectors on the one hand
and fossil fuel production sectors on the other hand. Output of each non-energy sector
and the electricity sector is decomposed into the intermediate (non-energy) inputs and in
a sector speciﬁc ’Energy-Value-added’ composite using a Leontief functional form. The
non-energy intermediate inputs are composites of domestically produced goods and their
imported equivalents. The ’Energy-Value-added’ composite is decomposed into an energy
composite and a value-added composite using a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
functional form. WIAGEM decomposes value-added into its constituents capital and
labour also using a CES functional form.
For each fossil fuel production sector, the output good is decomposed into a sector
speciﬁc fossil fuel resource of this fuel, and a sector speciﬁc aggregate good which contains
labour, capital, and this fossil fuel input itself in ﬁxed proportions. The ﬁrst decomposi-
tion uses a CES-function, while the second layer uses a Leontief production function to
represent the ﬁxed proportions.
Final demand in each region is modeled by a representative household, who maximizes
it’s region’s discounted utility over the model’s time horizon given his income. WIAGEM
6assumes that the utility function is of a Constant Inter-temporal Elasticity of Substitution
(CIES) type. The consumer obtains income from its endowments of time which it can
sell as labour, from his initial endowment of capital in each production sector, from the
rents it obtains on fossil fuel production, and from tax revenue.
The description of the consumer’s choice between consumption and investment in
each period is derived from growth theoretic models, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
This model is essentially a so-called Ramsey model. In such models, the consumption-
investment decision of an inﬁnitely living consumer is taken under consideration, where
consumption and investment ultimately reach a steady state growth rate which is constant.
The model here diﬀers in two important aspects from the growth theoretic approach: The
CGE model considers a ﬁnite horizon, and the CGE model computes a sequence of equi-
libria which do not imply the existence of a steady state growth rate in consumption and
investment. The solution to the ﬁrst problem is often to split the life time of the inﬁnitely
living consumer into two parts. The ﬁrst part consists of the periods under consideration,
while the second part considers all remaining time periods. Utility maximization over the
ﬁrst part starts with an initial endowment of capital in each stock. Utility maximization
over the second part starts with a capital endowment in each stock that would result
at the beginning of the next period. The latter stocks are taken from the income of the
consumer at the ﬁrst period. We have to choose a value for each of these computed capital
stocks, which determines optimal consumption and investment. WIAGEM chooses them
by imposing a constant growth rate on investment in the last period. This condition then
becomes an extra condition for the utility maximizing problem.
Solving the inter-temporal optimization problem results in an optimal consumption
plan for the time span and optimal savings follow indirectly from the remaining income
after consumption. Since we assume the utility function of the consumption household to
be homogeneous of degree one, we use expenditure minimization to obtain the optimal
amounts of each good providing one unit of utility. Total expenditure on consumption
equals expenditure per unit of util times the amount of utils. Total expenditure on
consumption plus total expenditure on buying the investment good equals the consumer’s
income in each period.
The model uses a CES function to obtain the aggregate consumption good from a
non-energy composite good and an energy composite. The consumer price index of this
composite consumption good is then obtained from the minimum expenditure on the
non-energy composite and the energy composite to obtain one unit of this aggregate con-
sumption good. The non-energy composite is decomposed into the non-energy goods using
a Cobb-Douglas function. The expenditures on the non-energy goods are composites of
domestically produced goods and their imported equivalents. CGE modelers often call
such composite goods so-called ’Armington goods’, referring to Armington (1969).
7The consumption and production of non-energy goods contain an energy composite which
is decomposed into the output goods of the energy and electricity production sectors. See
also Bernstein et al. (999b) for a clariﬁcation of the energy composite. We use a CES
function to decompose each aggregate into its constituent parts. The energy composite is
decomposed into the electricity good and a fossil fuel aggregate. The electricity goods in
these CES functions are again composites of domestically produced goods of the electricity
sector and its imported equivalents. The fossil composite is decomposed into a coal good
and a non-coal composite. The non-coal composite is decomposed into a gas good and an
oil good.
The use of a unit of a fossil fuel will lead to a certain share of emissions in each green-
house gas. WIAGEM considers emissions in CO2, and considers the other greenhouse
gases, CH4 and N2O, in CO2 equivalents. CO2 emissions are computed proportional to
the fossil fuel consumption in each production sector.
Oil is traded internationally as a homogenous good at one price, hence the producer prices
of oil in each region are determined by the world market price. The non-oil fossil fuels
as well as the non-energy goods are represented as ’Armington goods’ to approximate
the eﬀects of infrastructure requirements and high transport costs between some regions.
This means that these goods are composites of its domestically produced and its imported
equivalent.
The traded non-oil fossil fuel and non-energy goods are supposed to have diﬀerent
prices depending on whether they are produced for domestic use or for export. WIAGEM
uses a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function to decompose the output
good of these production sectors. The composite traded non-oil fossil fuel and non-energy
goods are decomposed into a good produced for domestic sales and its equivalents pro-
duced for exports using a CET function.
WIAGEM assumes that there is perfect competition on the markets. We deﬁne an equi-
librium in this economy as a set of prices and activity levels such that the economy
exhibits
• market clearing: the activity levels of each production sector clear the market for
the particular output good, while the market for production factors are cleared by
the underlying price.
• zero proﬁts: the price of each tradable good is determined by the minimum cost to
produce one unit of this good.
The market clearing condition depends on whether a tradable good market is considered
8or a market for production factors. In the case of a market for tradable goods, the market
price of this good is determined by the marginal cost to produce this good, while the
activity level of the production sector is determined by total demand for this good. The
output good of a region’s production sector is produced to satisfy domestic sales and
exported sales. Domestic sales satisfy the demand for this good as an intermediate good
in other domestic production sectors and as ﬁnal consumption. Furthermore, we assume
that part of domestic sales are meant to represent investment costs for this production
sector.
In any period, a region can be running a trade deﬁcit or a trade surplus, but by the ter-
minal year, the debt of a region must have been returned to baseline levels. In any inﬁnite
horizon model, this closure rule immediately follows naturally from the budget constraint
and prevents the possibility of an inﬁnite accumulation of debt (the literature refers to
a ’no-Ponzi games’ condition). WIAGEM, as a ﬁnite horizon model, approximates this
inﬁnite horizon condition by assuming that there be no net change in foreign indebted-
ness over the ﬁnite horizon. Such closure is consistent with neoclassical economics (See
Bernstein et al. (999a)).
The investments of all production sectors are combined into an aggregate investment
good particular to the region. The activity level of these investment sectors then satisﬁes
demand for these investment goods. The regional households spend their savings on
buying this investment good. WIAGEM adopts a closure on investment and savings,
assuming that there is equality between total savings of the consumers, i.e. total demand
for the investment good, and the supply of this good by the regional investment sector.
Notice that, in equilibrium, the optimal amount of utils for a representative consumer
follows immediately from equating expenditure per unit of util times the optimal amount
of utils to this consumer’s income. In some sense, the amount of utils of a consumer
household plays a role similar to the activity level of a production sector. It follows from
the homogeneity of degree zero property of the utility functions that the price of a util
equals the expenditure to obtain one unit of it. This util price can be interpreted as a
consumer price index.
In the case of a market for production factors, the equilibrium market price arises
as the price clearing the market for this production factor. The capital market is a
production sector speciﬁc market. Hence, the price of this sector’s capital good is such
that the demand for capital by this sector is satisﬁed by the regional endowment of this
capital good. The labour market is a regional market, which makes the wage rate the
clearing price between demand for labour by the regional production sectors and the
regional endowment of time spent for labour. Due to the homogeneity of degree zero in
the excess demand and the supply functions in the equilibrium equations, any positive
multiple of an equilibrium price vector will result in an equilibrium. We therefore have to
9choose a numeraire good. WIAGEM chooses the wage rate as numeraire.
There will be a gap between producer prices and consumer prices due to possible taxes
or subsidies imposed by the regional government on this good. Similarly, there will be a
gap between export producer price and consumer price due to possible tariﬀs or export
subsidies imposed by a regional government.
2.2 Climate
The total emissions in each period follow from adding the CO2 emissions over regions
and over production sectors and over consumption households during this period. These
emissions result from economic activities. Economic activities such as consumption and
production require a certain amount of fossil fuel use. We take CO2 emissions as a
ﬁxed share of the equilibrium demand for coal, oil, gas, and petroleum by producers and
consumers.
3 Policy scenarios
In this paper, we are interested in the consequences of China as a developing country
joining an emission permit market among the Annex B regions under diﬀerent assumptions
with respect to the allocation of emission targets to China. Within the CGE modeling
framework, this is translated in the allocation of an endowment of emission permits to the
participants on the emission permit trading market. Zhang (2000) distinguishes between
governmental trading of emission permits, where permits are allocated to the regional
governments who are then the sole actors on the permit market, and trading by ﬁrms,
where the permits are allocated to the regional production sectors. Under the latter
regime, the regional governments have to ﬁnd a rule that allocates their emission permit
endowments over the production sectors. Jensen and Rasmussen (2000) recall that this
can be done by so-called ’grandfathering’ allocation rules, e.g. depending on the sector’s
emissions or depending on the share of the sector in regional GDP. By auctioning the
permits over the interested production sectors instead, the government can obtain the
sector’s value of these permits.
Truong (2003) argues that emission permits are likely to be distributed according
to some grandfathering rule because the issue of equity is an important argument in
convincing countries to participate. Under a grandfathering rule, there are several rules
to choose from. Truong (2003) mentions
• the rule of equiproportionate reduction in emission levels, where all countries are
required to reduce their emission levels by the same proportion relative to the base
year to achieve a particular global target;
10• the equal per capita rule, where each human is required to be assigned the same
emission rights;
• the equal per GDP emission rule, where each country is entitled to the same emission
rights per unit of this country’s GDP.
The ﬁrst rule is the most straightforward, and it was used for the setting of most of the
emission reduction targets for Annex B countries in the Kyoto Protocol. As an example
of such a rule, we deﬁne a ’Kyoto scenario’, where China is allocated an initial endowment
of emission permits equal to their 1990 Business-as-Usual levels of CO2 emissions.
The rule of equiproportionate reduction in emission levels may however be considered
inequitable by many countries such as the developing countries. Developing countries
argue that, historically, the industrialized countries are responsible for the current con-
centrations of GHG’s in the atmosphere and these developed countries should therefore
bear the greater burden of emission reductions. Industrialized countries, in particular the
USA, on the other hand argue that, although current levels of emission levels may be low,
on the mid or longer term, some developing countries, notably China and India, will have
emission levels that are as high as those of industrialized countries. The United States
demanded a higher share of the developing countries in the international eﬀort to reduce
emissions, for example by setting a growth target, i.e. tying emissions to a certain level
of GDP (see United States (1998)). As such, we deﬁne a so-called ’US’-scenario, which
can also be seen as an example of the third rule.
If the more equitable and more eﬀective equal per GDP emission rules are to be
applied, this will put a great burden on the developing countries during the initial years
when the major concerns in these countries are for social and economic development that
environmental protection. A compromise solution may be to apply these rules gradually,
or, as proposed by the Center for Clean Air Policy (CAP) by setting a so-called ’growth-
baseline’ for these developing countries such as China. By imposing such a growth-baseline
for the developing countries, emissions are allowed to rise, but they are tied to GDP
growth (see Hargrave (1998)). We deﬁne a ’CAP’-scenario to capture the consequences
of imposing such a rule.
These scenarios are then compared to a ’Business-as-Usual scenario’ (BaU). In order
to determine the impact of China joining an Annex B emission permit market, we also
deﬁne an ’Annex B’ scenario (Annex B) where there is an emission permits market among
the Annex B regions in place. This allows us to assess the impact of China on the price
of emission permits.
Business-as-Usual (BaU) No action is undertaken to reduce emissions. This scenario
assumes no speciﬁc intervention to limit the rate of greenhouse gas emissions but it does
11allow for anticipated changes in demographic, economic, industrial, and technological
developments as well as environmental policies not directly aimed at limiting greenhouse
gas emissions. Greenhouse gas emissions both for Annex B countries and non-Annex
B countries are expected to rise unconstrainedly. Hence in this scenario, no market for
emission permits exists. We could suppose that the price of emissions is zero so that
nobody takes account of their emissions.
Annex B (Annex B) Under this scenario, we assume that only the Annex B regions are
participating in a market for emission permits. Let e(r) denote the 1990 level of carbon
emissions in each region r. Table 3 gives an overview of these levels as stated in Kemfert
(2002).
r: ASIA CAN CHN EU15 JPN LSA
e(r): 1.1025 0.2658 1.3215 1.1258 0.3012 0.2845
r: MEX MIDE REC RoW SSA USA
e(r): 0.1016 0.2146 0.7985 2.3158 0.1126 1.6854
Table 3: The 1990 levels of carbon emissions (in billions of tons carbon equiv-
alent), e(r), in each region r. Source: Kemfert (2002).
Deﬁne an emission permit as an allowance for the owner to emit a certain amount of CO2.
Then, e(r) refers to the initial endowment of CO2 emission permits in region r ∈ R(co2)
where the set R(co2) refers to the set of regions that participate in the emission permit
market. In the Annex B scenario, we therefore take R(co2) = AnnexB.
Each production sector s in region r has a cost minimizing input demand asr(coal)
of the coal good, asr(gas) of the gas good, and asr(oil) of the oil good. We assume that,
per unit of input of fossil fuel h, h ∈ {coal,gas,oil}, there is an emission of co2shr(h)
units of CO2. Table 4 gives an overview of these shares as stated in Manne et al. (1995).
h: coal gas oil
co2shr(h): 0.02412 0.0137 0.0199
Table 4: CO2-coeﬃcients, co2shr(h), for each fossil fuel h, h ∈ {coal,gas,oil} (in
tons of carbon equivalent per gigajoule of crude oil equivalent.). Source:
Manne et al. (1995), Table 2.
In the Annex B scenario, we assume that each production sector s, in order to be able
to maintain its activity level, exercises a demand for
12X
h∈{coal,gas,oil}
co2shr(h) · asr(h) (1)
emission permits. This demand for emission permits depends on the permit price pco2
that clears the underlying regional market R(co2). Within this region, this leads to an





co2shr(h) · asr(h) − e(r). (2)
Since WIAGEM takes account of possible sinks, the excess demand for emission permits
is reduced with the amount of permits equivalent to the amount of emissions absorbed
by these sinks.
On the market of emission permits there is a total excess demand equal to
P
r∈R(co2) zr(pco2).
This market is cleared by the price of emission permits pco2. The Annex B equilibrium is
then computed by adding the good ’CO2 emission permits’ to WIAGEM and a comple-
mentarity condition
P
r∈R(co2) zr(pco2) = 0 ⊥ pco2 ≥ 0, (3)
for periods 2010 and forward.
Kyoto (Kyoto) Under this scenario, we assume that China is oﬃcially obliged, like any
other Annex B region, to stabilize emissions on its 1990 level. We take R(co2) =
AnnexB ∪ {CHN} in (3) and add e(CHN) = 1.3215 for each period from 2010 on, as an
initial endowment for China when entering the market. This endowment is assumed to
be the Annex B Kyoto target for China following 2010. In the literature, such a scenario
is often referred to as ’Kyoto forever’.
United States (US) One of the objectives of the United States in the Kyoto negotiations
was to secure a meaningful participation of the developing countries. A developing country
could for example voluntarily adopt an emission target. United States (1998) thinks that,
if a developing country chooses to adopt a growth target and participate in international
emissions trading, it could potentially enjoy substantial economical and environmental
gains. Even with this participation, a country’s emissions could continue to grow beyond
current levels, as economic development continues.
In order to simulate such a scenario, we take R(co2) = AnnexB ∪ {CHN} in (3) and
add e(CHN) = 1.7571 for 2010 and later, which equals the ’Business-as-Usual’ emissions
level of emissions of China in 2010 as calculated by WIAGEM in its ’Business-as-Usual’
scenario, as an initial endowment for China when entering the market.
13Center for Clean Air Policy (CAP) In order to establish an international climate
change policy that fully accommodates a developing country’s economic growth but re-
quires that this growth be achieved in a carbon-eﬃcient manner, Hargrave (1998) proposes
to apply the concept of a growth baseline. The main beneﬁt of adapting a growth baseline
is the occurrence of substantial capital inﬂows through emission trading. If baselines were
set so that developing countries could meet and go beyond their emission commitments
through low cost measures alone, these countries would be able to generate emission
trading possibilities at low expense and then sell emission allowances to industrialized
ones.
This scenario is implemented by taking R(co2) = AnnexB ∪ {CHN} in (3). Following
Hargrave (1998), let e(CHN) be tied to the growth in GDP in China. Hargrave (1998)
estimates a carbon eﬃciency in 1995 of 1.29 tC/US$1000 when using a market exchange rate.
We then can set et(CHN) = 1.29 · GDPt(CHN) for periods t following 2010.
4 Simulations
In order for China to participate in an existing emission permit market, we should provide
China with a realizable target for its emissions in 2010 and onwards. The policy scenarios
introduced in the previous section provide three diﬀerent approaches. The ’Kyoto’ sce-
nario lets China accept its BaU 1990 levels of CO2 emissions as its target for 2010 and
onwards, like any other Annex B party on the permit market. But it may be that such an
approach is very likely to severely hamper China in its development. The two alternative
scenarios therefore take account of this observation and choose a more realistic target.
The main issue in these simulations is how these opposing eﬀects on the development of
China work out on welfare under the diﬀerent policy options. We therefore concentrate
on the eﬀects on emissions, the permit price that arises on the market, and on welfare in
particular. Welfare is measured by the Hicksian Equivalent Variation and alternatively
by changes in GDP.
We start our analysis with the consequences of implementing the four scenarios described
in Section 3 on emission levels in China after 2010. Table 5 provides the simulation results
with respect to total emissions of China for each scenario.
We notice in Table 5 that implementing any of the scenarios will result in lower levels
of emissions in China compared to the BaU scenario. The Kyoto scenario looks most
successful with respect to limiting the growth of emissions, − at least initially −, but it
is also the most stringent one by imposing 1990 levels on its 2010 target. It is interesting
to note that the CAP scenario level of emissions overtakes the Kyoto scenario level of
emissions after 2030. This is probably due to the fact that, by improving energy eﬃciency
14Year BaU Kyoto US CAP
2010 1.7571 1.3275 1.6771 1.3626
2020 1.9812 1.5899 1.8812 1.6069
2030 2.1086 1.7723 1.9886 1.7727
2040 2.2040 1.9692 2.0640 1.8832
2050 2.3762 2.2248 2.2282 2.0604
Table 5: Total emissions of China (in billions of ton
carbon equivalent) for each scenario.
in China, the constant limit on emissions imposed under the Kyoto scenario becomes less
and less stringent, while this limit keeps adjusting itself with the improving eﬃciency
under the CAP scenario, causing no relaxation of the pressure imposed by this limit. The
United States scenario looks the least promising with respect to reducing emissions but,
as Table 6 will show, it has the least negative impacts on China’s GDP levels. In Table 6,
we summarized the computed GDP levels of China under these scenario’s.
Year BaU Kyoto US CAP
2010 659 647.97 657.96 648.40
2020 988 971.95 986.94 972.60
2030 1573 1551.49 1571.47 1552.35
2040 2564 2530.89 2560.86 2532.18
2050 4121 4077.30 4117.25 4079.02
Table 6: GDP levels of China in billion 1995 US$ for each scenario.
As Table 6 shows, the Kyoto scenario also has the most negative impact on China’s
GDP levels after 2010. It shows the lowest levels of GDP of all scenarios. This was to be
expected since the other two scenarios were meant to take account of the possible negative
impact of a too stringent target on GDP in China. The Center for Clean Air Policy
scenario oﬀers a lower GDP level than the United States scenario. GDP levels of CAP
will be generally lower than in the BaU scenario, providing China with lower endowments
of emission permits than under the United States scenario. It should therefore either
buy more permits on the market or put more eﬀort in decreasing emissions by itself,
than it does under the United States scenario. This invokes extra costs on the eﬀorts
of China to curb emissions. All this results into a lower development of GDP under the
Center for Clean Air Policy scenario. GDP levels under the United States scenario are
consistently lower than under the BaU scenario, where China does not impose itself a
growth target. Hence our simulation does not conﬁrm the expectations of the US that
15adopting a growth target and participating in international emission permit trading would
potentially bring substantial economical and environmental gains to China. Nevertheless,
economic development continues, be it at a slightly lower level as under BaU. The United
States scenario does have the least negative impacts on economic development when
compared to the other scenario’s though.
United States (1998) expects that a world with the participation of developing coun-
tries in an international emission trading market with growth targets slightly below their
BaU projections would likely result in lower greenhouse gas emissions relative to a world
with more narrow participation. In Table 7 we have depicted total global emissions for
each scenario. It conﬁrms this claim.
Year Annex B Kyoto US CAP
2010 12.8111 11.3492 11.6988 11.3843
2020 14.6906 13.3927 13.6841 13.4097
2030 15.6556 14.2459 14.4622 14.2463
2040 16.6032 15.1408 15.2355 15.0547
2050 17.8373 16.3601 16.3635 16.1958
Table 7: Total global emissions (in billions of ton carbon equivalent)
for each scenario.
The Center for Clean Air Policy scenario imposes a growth baseline on the emissions
in China. Under such a growth baseline, the developing country’s emissions would not be
capped, but these countries would have to make sure that their greenhouse gas emissions
grew at a rate tied to their economic output. In this way, the growth of the developing
countries would not be restrained, but countries would commit to improving the ’emission-
intensity’ of this growth compared to the BaU. Table 8 provides the emission intensity
of China under each scenario. The Center for Clean Air Policy scenario clearly shows an
improvement in intensity. Under each scenario, emissions intensity is improving over the
years. Also under the BaU scenario, Table 6 shows a sharp increase in GDP levels in
China over the years, while Table 8 indicates a decrease in emission levels in China itself.
So, the development in China will show an improvement in emission intensity.
Under the Kyoto and United States scenarios, emission intensity improves better than
under the BaU scenario. The Kyoto scenario obviously ends worst in comparison to the
United States and the Center for Clean Air Policy scenarios. Emission intensity in the
United States scenario improves below the Kyoto scenario only in 2050, while this already
occurs in 2030 for the Center for Clean Air Policy scenario.
When we introduce the possibility of a market in emission permits, we can interpret the
16Year BaU Kyoto US CAP
2010 2666.94 2048.47 2548.99 2101.51
2020 2004.73 1635.76 1906.14 1652.14
2030 1340.26 1142.33 1265.43 1141.96
2040 859.73 778.10 805.97 743.70
2050 576.63 545.64 541.19 505.13
Table 8: Emission intensity in China for each scenario.
emissions of each production sector as a demand for emission permits. The supply of
these emission permits is then given by the allocation of emission allowances under the
diﬀerent scenarios. In Table 9, we have given an overview of the endowments of emission
permits for China in each period under each scenario.
Year Kyoto US CAP
2010 1.3215 1.7571 0.8501
2020 1.3215 1.7571 1.2745
2030 1.3215 1.7571 2.0292
2040 1.3215 1.7571 3.3076
2050 1.3215 1.7571 5.3161
Table 9: The endowments of emission permits for China (in billions of ton
carbon equivalent) for each scenario.
When we compare total emissions for China under each scenario as presented in Table 5
with the amounts of emissions allowed to China by its permit allocation in Table 9, we
see the following. Under the Kyoto scenario, China always demands emission permits
since its allocated endowment of permits is obviously too low. The US scenario allocates
a much higher endowment of permits to China. This allocation is so high that China
will be able to supply its excess permits to the market for the ﬁrst two periods. After
2030, China’s economy and hence its emissions have grown so high that its allowance
is overtaken and China becomes a demander for emission permits. The CAP scenario
exhibits a completely opposing eﬀect. China, under the CAP scenario, demands emission
permits for the ﬁrst two periods, and turns into a supplier of emission permits from 2030
onwards. This eﬀect is due to linking emission permit endowments in each period to the
level of GDP. A developing country like China will exhibit a comparably large growth
in GDP, and therefore its allowance of emission permits will rise accordingly. The initial
shortage of emission permits under the CAP scenario might indicate a too low estimation
of emission intensity in Hargrave (1998) when applying our model.
17On a market for emission permits, the participating regions will start trading these
permits, and a price of such emission permits clears the market. In Table 10, we have
provided the emission permit price that arises under each scenario. We have added the
price of emission permits that would arise in the Annex B scenario, when only the Annex
B regions participate on the market.
Year Annex B Kyoto US CAP
2010 5 21 15 21
2020 21 45 32 35
2030 54 78 64 68
2040 71 101 85 91
2050 101 121 105 103
Table 10: The price of emission permits (in 1995 US$
per ton carbon) under the diﬀerent scenarios.
Under the Kyoto scenario, we assume that China intends to stabilize its 2010 emissions
to 1990 levels. Consequently, China will demand emissions permits. Introducing this extra
demand on the emission permit market leads to a higher permit price compared to the
Annex B scenario. Furthermore, since emissions increase over time, demand for emission
permits will also increase so, over time, the price of emissions will also increase.
The United States scenario chooses an emission target for China slightly below its
BaU emission level for 2010. Since this level is lower than the 1990 level of emissions
for China, the inclusion of China into an emissions market adds an excess demand for
emission permits to this market that will be lower than under the Kyoto scenario. Hence,
the smaller rise in excess demand on the permit market under the US scenario implies a
lower permit price to clear the market compared to the Kyoto scenario.
China is obliged to improve its emissions eﬃciency under the Center for Clean Air
Policy scenario, which requires higher emission reductions as compared to the United
States scenario that only required a stabilization of emissions to BaU level. Hence the
permit price under the Center for Clean Air Policy scenario is mainly higher than under
the United States scenario.
The price of emission permits as calculated by WIAGEM in Table 10 are in general
much lower than the emission permit prices mentioned in other publications that are
often based on partial equilibrium models. With respect to partial equilibrium models,
WIAGEM, like other CGE models, allows the production sectors to substitute away from
emission intensive technologies, which may also give rise to a lower excess demand for
permits in comparison to partial equilibrium models. Partial equilibrium models only
consider one market and abstract away from substitution eﬀects.
18The impact of policies on welfare are often measured in computational general equilibrium
modeling by looking at the consequences of these policies on the welfare of the regional
household. We ask ourselves with how much we should compensate the regional household
in income, to make him as well oﬀ as under the BaU scenario. This measure is known in
economic theory as the Hicksian Equivalent Variation. On the other hand, policy makers
like to refer to the consequences of implementing policies on GDP levels in each region. We
have summarized the consequences of implementing the diﬀerent scenarios on the welfare
of each region through the Hicksian Equivalent variation in Table 11. The consequences
on GDP in China were already given in Table 6.
Region Kyoto US CAP
ASIA −0.0638 −0.0638 −0.0633
CAN −0.0672 −0.0673 −0.0670
CHN −0.0273 −0.0023 −0.0262
EU15 −0.1719 −0.1706 −0.1660
JPN −0.1014 −0.0999 −0.0975
LSA −0.0426 −0.0426 −0.0424
MEX −0.0329 −0.0329 −0.0326
MIDE −0.0232 −0.0232 −0.0219
REC 0.0660 0.0560 0.0635
ROW −0.0413 −0.0429 −0.0424
SSA −0.0315 −0.0328 −0.0328
USA −0.0067 −0.0060 −0.0066
Table 11: The change in welfare in each region as mea-
sured by the Hicksian Equivalent Variation.
Under the Kyoto scenario, we see that welfare as measured by the Hicksian Equivalent
Variation as well as in GDP declines in China and also in other countries because of the
increase in the permit price. Under the United States scenario, there is a lower permit
price which leads to a lower economic decline. Russia (REC) will obtain lower revenues
from selling its hot air, hence welfare improvement for Russia is lower. Consequently,
China’s welfare is improved compared to Kyoto. The Center for Clean Air Policy sce-
nario shows a China that experiences higher welfare losses but also a higher permit price
because China demands permits. This leads again to higher revenue gains for Russia
(REC) as compared to the United States scenario.
195 Conclusions
During the last years, the developed countries, in particular the United States, have
increased pressure on the developing countries to provide a signiﬁcant contribution to
international eﬀorts to curb the sharply increasing trend in greenhouse gas emissions
generated by global economic activities. The developing countries have objected to this
pressure by claiming that their economic development would be severely hampered by
the sharp increase in costs on their economies following such an eﬀort. In this paper,
we study the consequences of a developing country, China, joining the Annex B regions
on a market for emission permits. When China joins an emission trading regime, some
consideration should be given to the emission target that should be set. This target deﬁnes
the initial endowment of permits with which China enters trading on such a market. We
considered two proposals with respect to setting such a target. One proposal was provided
by the United States to set the target of a developing country equal to its ’Business-as-
Usual’ level in 2010. Another proposal was given by the Center for Clean Air Policy
which introduces a ’growth baseline’ for the developing country, which ties this country’s
emissions to its growth in GDP. We have compared the results of these two proposals
with a situation where China is obliged to fulﬁll the conditions set in the Kyoto Protocol
and with a ’Business-as-Usual’ scenario.
From our simulations, we conclude that all scenarios will decrease the welfare of China
as measured by the Hicksian Equivalent Variation. The impact on welfare under the
diﬀerent scenarios do not diﬀer for all the regions, except for China. To China, it is of
major diﬀerence whether the ’Kyoto’ proposal or the ’CAP’ proposal is accepted, or the
US proposal. The US proposal leaves China best oﬀ as compared to the other proposals
but it is least successful with curbing emissions, globally as well as for China.
All scenario’s also show a decrease in GDP levels in China. This trend is comparable
with what we saw with respect to China’s welfare measured with the Hicksian Equivalent
Variation. So, both measures of welfare are in agreement here. This is not always the case,
as the Hicksian Equivalent Variation also takes account of a policy measure’s beneﬁcial
aspects to welfare.
The decrease in welfare for nearly all regions including China indicates that the ex-
pectations stated in United States (1998) that a developing country which chooses to
adopt a growth target and participate in international emission trading could potentially
enjoy substantial economical gains cannot be conﬁrmed by the simulations in this paper.
A similar result holds for the CAP scenario. This scenario intended to account for the
objections of the developing countries by setting a growth baseline on emission eﬃciency
such that economic growth would not be hampered. The simulations with WIAGEM in-
dicate that the growth baseline set in Hargrave (1998) does not achieve this goal, thereby
requiring a lowering of this baseline.
20The increased price of emission permits when applying the alternative scenarios seems
to be the driving force behind the welfare decreases compared to the BaU scenario. This
price refers to the (opportunity) costs of emission reduction in the regions that participate
on the emission permit market. WIAGEM follows the existing CGE and IA models in
modeling the cost of emission policies for the production sectors, and omits the possibly
beneﬁcial eﬀects of decreasing emissions on society. This causes an underestimation of
the welfare eﬀects associated with climate change policies. We therefore call to include
these so-called second-order eﬀects into the model by providing a complete coupling of
the economic model and the climate model. Consequently, the simulations in a model
that includes such second-order eﬀects may give more support to the proposals studied
in this paper.
Notice that none of the scenario’s discussed here nor in the literature takes account
that a developing country such as China will in due time become a developed country.
As for the US scenario, this would oblige China to adhere to the conditions underlying
the Kyoto scenario after some period of time. Since the CAP scenario requires China to
improve its energy eﬃciency over time, it can be expected to meet the Kyoto scenario
requirements after such a period of time.
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